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Although prior research suggests that people should not prefer random chance to determine their outcomes,
we propose that in the context of prosocial requests, a contingent of people prefer to rely on chance. We argue
that this is because they are conﬂicted between losing resources (e.g., time, money) and losing moral self-
regard. Across ﬁve studies, in both choices with binary outcomes (whether to volunteer) and ranges of out-
comes (how much to donate), some people preferred to be randomly assigned an outcome rather than to
make their own choices. This did not negatively affect prosocial behavior in binary choices and improved
prosocial behavior in choices with a range of outcomes. We also found that the preference for a random out-
come was stronger when participants felt particularly conﬂicted. Furthermore, we examined precisely who
sorted into the random option. Importantly, choosing the random option decreased moral self-reproach, thus
increasing consumer welfare. Our ﬁndings speak to consumers’ psychological experience of prosocial requests
and suggest an intervention that may increase consumer welfare and prosocial behavior.
Keywords Behavioral decision theory; Charity and prosocial behavior; Decision making; Ethics
and morality; Preference and choice
With prosocial organizations like St. Jude’s Chil-
dren’s Hospital pairing with big companies like
KMart and Best Buy, consumers are increasingly
faced with prosocial appeals in their everyday
lives. When checking out online or at a brick-and-
mortar store, consumers are commonly asked
whether they would like to donate a set amount
(e.g., a dollar) to a cause. Other times, they are
asked if they would like to choose one of a range
of donation options (e.g., rounding up to the near-
est dollar, donating $1.00, or donating $5.00). These
appeals are clearly effective at eliciting prosocial
behavior. Donations made by individuals rose in
2016 to $281.86 billion, making up 72% of dona-
tions to prosocial organizations (Giving USA Foun-
dation, 2017). Although directly asking consumers
to donate time or money certainly increases proso-
cial behavior, it may do so at a cost to consumer
welfare; that is, consumers facing prosocial requests
can feel trapped in a moral dilemma: they can help
at the cost of their resources (e.g., time or money),
or they can act out of self-interest at the cost of
their moral self-regard (Berman & Small, 2012;
Dunn, Ashton-James, Hanson, & Aknin, 2010;
Gneezy, Gneezy, Riener, & Nelson, 2012). Thus,
many consumers view prosocial requests as lose-
lose situations that necessarily leave them worse off
than they were originally.
Research has shown that prosocial requests can
be so uncomfortable for some consumers that they
would prefer to avoid them altogether (Andreoni,
Rao, & Trachtman, 2017; Dana, Cain, & Dawes,
2006; DellaVigna, List, & Malmendier, 2012; Gneezy
et al., 2012; Lin, Schaumberg, & Reich, 2016). Even
when faced with choices in which they can donate
what they want and can choose to donate a small
amount, consumers avoid donating for fear that
they will send a negative self-signal by donating
too little (Gneezy et al., 2012). Consumers go so far
as to avoid these tradeoffs at a personal cost, such
as foregoing a chance to earn extra money (Lin
et al., 2016) or foregoing a chance to buy aReceived 8 October 2017; accepted 9 October 2017
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desirable product (Gneezy et al., 2012). These situa-
tions thus lead to worse outcomes for consumers
and possibly for organizations associated with the
prosocial requests. Is it possible to eliminate these
costs? We propose that consumers may sometimes
prefer to avoid agency in the context of prosocial
requests and instead choose to rely on chance to
make a decision for them. By relying on chance, we
mean choosing to be randomly assigned to an out-
come rather than choosing to comply with or refuse
a prosocial request.
The Preference for Random Outcomes
Random Outcomes in Decision Making
Prior literature suggests that people are not likely
to choose to give up agency in choice. Rational
choice theory and conventional wisdom suggest
that people will only choose a random outcome
when they are truly indifferent between the out-
comes (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). Addi-
tionally, people tend to have an aversion to
uncertain outcomes (Simonsohn, 2009); for instance,
participants valued a lottery between two outcomes
(a $50 gift card and a $100 gift card) less than they
valued the lottery’s lowest possible outcome (a $50
gift card). Furthermore, people are generally averse
to resolving issues via concrete randomizers, such
as ﬂipping a coin (Keren & Teigen, 2010).
However, there are certain instances in which
people have been shown to prefer random out-
comes. For example, when relying on a random
outcome increases procedural fairness, such as
when it can correct for a previous bias, people may
prefer to ﬂip a coin (Bolton, Brandts, & Ockenfels,
2005). More relevant to our current research, people
also choose to resort to random chance when they
wish to be absolved of responsibility or agency for
the moral consequences of their choice, for instance,
when their decisions could cause harm to others
(Leonhardt, Keller, & Pechmann, 2011). This aver-
sion to responsibility for the choice even occurs
when people are concerned about simply making
the wrong choice between mundane items (e.g., gift
card options) and even when randomizers are
weighted (e.g., 60% for one choice, 40% for another
choice; Dwenger, K€ubler, & Weizs€acker, 2012). This
suggests that, even if people have a preference for
one outcome over another, they may still prefer to
be randomly assigned an outcome to decrease per-
sonal responsibility for the choice and to avoid
potential regret.
Random Outcomes in Prosocial Choice Contexts
In the current research, we examine whether peo-
ple have a preference to rely on chance (i.e., choose
to be randomly assigned an outcome) when faced
with prosocial requests in order to absolve responsi-
bility or agency for the choice. We study this in the
context of prosocial requests because, rather than
simply being a difﬁcult choice due to uncertainty of
preference, these requests elicit a conﬂict between
people’s self-interest and moral integrity. This ten-
sion inherently exists for some consumers when they
face prosocial requests, leading them to trade off self-
interest with moral self-view. Prosocial requests fur-
ther differ from other types of decisions in the type
of affect they elicit. Whereas making difﬁcult choices
can lead to post-choice regret or dissatisfaction,
choosing to refuse a prosocial request can lead to
self-conscious emotions, such as shame and guilt (de
Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011;
Xu, Begue, & Bushman, 2012). Finding that people
choose to rely on chance in this context would have
meaningful implications on the threat that prosocial
requests impose on people’s moral self-views and
the affective consequences of such threat.
Prior research has shown that people often prefer
to ﬂip a coin when choosing whether to assign them-
selves or a fellow participant the better of two activi-
ties; however, in that research, participants had the
option of lying (and indeed tended to lie) after they
ﬂipped the coin (Batson, Thompson, Seuferling,
Whitney, & Strongman, 1999). Thus, they arguably
chose the coin ﬂip to appear as though they had
made the self-interested choice fairly. However,
there is little research on whether people will choose
to adhere to a random outcome when facing proso-
cial requests. Previous work involving the dictator
game provides some initial suggestive evidence for
the preference for a random outcome (Dana, Weber,
& Kuang, 2007). Speciﬁcally, dictators and recipients
were informed that if dictators did not decide within
a random amount of time, the computer would
assign them to a prosocial or self-interested option.
Because dictators had this plausible deniability to
recipients, they made more self-interested choices.
More relevant to the current investigation, a sub-
stantial proportion of participants (24%) waited
longer than a decision would plausibly take for the
computer to randomly assign them (Dana et al.,
2007). Although this was an indirect test of the pref-
erence for a random outcome, this supports the idea
that, when choosing between self-interested and
prosocial outcomes, some people prefer to leave
their outcomes up to chance.
2 Lin and Reich
Current Research Objectives
We directly test the preference for a random option
in the context of prosocial requests by giving partic-
ipants the opportunity to actively choose to be ran-
domly assigned an outcome. Furthermore, we
examine who sorts into this random option—that
is, we predict that both those who would have
complied with a prosocial request and those who
would have refused it would elect to choose a ran-
dom outcome. This hypothesis is in line with the
ﬁnding that both those who would have originally
complied with and those who would have origi-
nally refused a direct request tend to avoid proso-
cial requests (Cain, Dana, & Newman, 2014; Lin
et al., 2016).
In response to prosocial requests, some con-
sumers refuse but feel self-reproach for doing so (de
Hooge et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2012). We predict that
some of those who would have originally refused
the request would prefer to take the choice out of
their hands to avoid this self-reproach cost. Other
consumers might be attracted to the random option
to avoid begrudgingly complying with the prosocial
request. This type of consumer complies with proso-
cial requests to avoid self-reproach in response to
direct requests. Indeed, across different experimen-
tal settings, roughly 50% of those who give do so
reluctantly (Cain et al., 2014). Industry research sup-
ports the idea that many who donate do so to avoid
self-reproach; 35% of consumers who have donated
at checkout counters report doing so out of guilt,
with an additional 10% listing peer pressure as a
reason (Good Scout Group, 2015). Relatedly, in pre-
vious research employing the dictator game para-
digm, many dictators chose to avoid information
about how a self-interested choice (i.e., receiving
$6.00 over $5.00) would affect the recipient’s payout
($1.00 or $5.00 payout). This chosen uncertainty
freed them to engage in the self-interested decision,
whereas, with full information, participants tended
to engage in more prosocial behavior (Dana et al.,
2007). Thus, dictators acted out of fairness mostly to
be presented positively to themselves or others; rely-
ing on uncertainty allowed them to engage in their
preferred self-interested behavior by remaining
ignorant of whether their behavior negatively
affected others. We suggest that allowing an out-
come to be determined by chance similarly frees
consumers of the self-reproach bind that constrains
them to their less preferred prosocial choice, offering
them the possibility of obtaining a self-interested
outcome without self-reproach. In our case,
however, participants themselves are subject to
uncertain outcomes. Therefore, we predict that both
those who would have an initial preference for the
prosocial option and those who would have an ini-
tial preference for the self-interested option might be
attracted to a random option, as it would allow
them a chance to achieve the self-interested outcome
without self-reproach.
We further extend prior research by directly
examining consumer welfare consequences of choos-
ing random outcomes. Previous research has shown
that people are happier if a self-interested outcome
is imposed on them than if they choose it for them-
selves (Berman & Small, 2012). Being randomly
assigned a self-interested outcome removes the self-
reproach that ordinarily comes with making the
self-interested decision because it removes the
agency associated with the outcome. Importantly, in
the cited research, participants were not given an
opportunity to choose a random outcome; rather,
they were simply assigned to one option or the
other. We propose that some people will choose to
be randomly assigned to their outcomes when they
are under moral conﬂict (i.e., when facing a proso-
cial request) so that they have a chance to achieve a
self-interested option while ridding themselves of
self-reproach. We predict that this release of agency
will lead to higher consumer welfare, even though
consumers risk actually engaging in the prosocial
behavior. Finally, we examine the obvious practical
issue of whether this intervention can increase
prosocial behavior in different choice contexts.
Overview of Studies
In our studies, we tested for the preference for a
random option when facing a choice between a
prosocial and a self-interested action. We opera-
tionalized a prosocial action as one that is burden-
some, but that has a clear beneﬁt for others. We
deﬁned a burdensome action as one requiring per-
sonal resources: cognitive, temporal, ﬁnancial, or
any combination of these resources. In Studies 1
through 3, our prosocial option was a task that ben-
eﬁtted others, but at the cost of cognitive and/or
temporal resources. In Studies 4 and 5, our proso-
cial option was a monetary donation.
In Study 1, we tested whether some people prefer
a random option when faced with a prosocial
request. We further tested whether people would
choose the random option even when they were not
indifferent and had an initial preference for one of
the options. Finally, we examined whether people
choose the random option due to a feeling of conﬂict
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between prosocial and self-interested options, rather
than for the sake of novelty. In Study 2, we explored
whether adding a random option could increase con-
sumer welfare by decreasing the dissatisfaction
inherent in making the decision between a prosocial
and a self-interested choice. In Study 3, we tested
whether people’s preference for the random option
persisted over repeated decisions rather than decay-
ing over time (as the novelty of a random option
wore off). In Study 4, we used a monetary context to
examine the preference for the random option when
deciding how much to donate within a range of
donation options, which is both practically imple-
mentable and more likely to lead to higher dona-
tions. We again examined the effect of including a
random option on consumer welfare. In Study 5, we
employed a similar design to Study 4, but we soli-
cited donations without ﬁrst endowing money.
Throughout, we tested whether giving a random
option changes rates of prosocial giving relative to
cases in which people are not given a random
option.
Target sample sizes for each experiment were
determined in advance of data collection based on
the principle that researchers should collect large
samples (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2013).
We therefore chose to collect at least 100 partici-
pants per cell for each study. In all studies, data
were collected until reaching the predetermined
sample size and were not analyzed until data col-
lection was complete. No independent variables or
manipulations were used besides those reported,
and no participant observations were excluded
from analysis. All dependent variables are also
reported for all studies. A university institutional
review board approved the research.
Study 1
Study 1 had four main objectives. First, we tested
whether a contingent of people would be attracted
to being randomly assigned either a self-interested
or a prosocial outcome. To do this, we gave partici-
pants a choice between a burdensome prosocial task
and a fun task. We also gave participants the oppor-
tunity to be randomly assigned one of the tasks. Sec-
ond, we tested whether people would choose the
random option despite having an a priori preference
for one of the tasks. Notably, rational choice theory
would suggest that people should only choose a ran-
dom option when they equally prefer the two
options (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). How-
ever, we predicted that people would anticipate that
actively choosing their preference comes with a cost
(i.e., engaging in a burdensome task or feeling self-
reproach), which would lead them to prefer a ran-
dom option because it provides an opportunity to
escape both costs. Third, we tested the effect of hav-
ing a random option on the rate of prosocial behav-
ior, predicting that it would not lower the rate of
prosocial behavior and might even increase it.
Fourth and ﬁnally, we aimed to show that the
preference for the random option was due to feel-
ing conﬂicted between the two options rather than
being drawn to the random option out of novelty.
To do this, we manipulated the amount of conﬂict
that was felt between choosing the two tasks by
varying how long the prosocial activity would take.
We predicted that participants would choose the
random option when the conﬂict was greatest—that
is, when the prosocial task was comparable in
length to the fun task. As the prosocial task became
longer, we predicted that participants would be less
likely to choose the random option and more likely
to simply choose the self-interested task.
Method
Participants
We recruited 300 Amazon Mechanical Turk
workers (Mage = 31.79; 150 male, 77 female; incom-
plete demographics due to error in study program-
ming, see procedure) to participate in this study in
exchange for $0.50.
Procedure
Participants read that they would have the
opportunity to choose a task to complete and that,
on average, the tasks should take about 5–10 min to
complete. They then viewed two options: a proso-
cial task and a humorous task. The prosocial task
required reading and evaluating an informational
pamphlet for The Water Project, which would pro-
vide meaningful feedback for the organization, and
the humorous task required reading a humorous
anecdote (average time 5 min) (all study materials
can be viewed in Appendix S1). We manipulated
the time that the prosocial task would take to com-
plete; the amount of time varied from 1 to 15 min
(randomly generated integers). We expected that
the choice would generate less conﬂict as the proso-
cial task became unreasonably burdensome (as peo-
ple would much prefer the humorous task).
Before making any decision, participants indi-
cated how torn they felt between the two options
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(1 = not at all torn, 7 = extremely torn), which was
our measure of conﬂict (van Harreveld, Rutjens, Rot-
teveel, Nordgren, & van der Pligt, 2009). They were
also asked to indicate their preference on a 100-point
sliding scale (numbers were not displayed to partici-
pants); the left endpoint (0) was labeled “much pre-
fer task 1 (informational pamphlet),” the right
endpoint (100) was labeled “much prefer task 2 (hu-
morous materials),” and the midpoint was labeled
“equally prefer.” We used this measure to categorize
participants into groups indicating their original
preference: having a preference for the prosocial task
(preference < 50), preference for the humorous task
(preference > 50), or equal preference (prefer-
ence = 50). Next, all participants were given the
opportunity to choose to be randomly assigned to a
task or to choose the task they would complete
on the next page. Finally, participants completed
the task that they chose or to which they were
assigned.
Afterwards, participants indicated in open-ended
format any feedback they had about the study and
what they thought the study was about. They then
indicated their gender, age, and how often they vol-
unteer. We collected volunteering information as a
potential moderator, but it did not have any moder-
ating effects on any of the outcomes, and thus we
do not mention it in any of the results sections.
However, there was an error in programming such
that those who ended up completing the prosocial
task did not view these questions, so demographics
are incomplete.
Results
Choice of Random Option
First, we assessed actual choice without consid-
ering the length of time manipulation (to be ana-
lyzed in the feelings of conﬂict section). Overall,
of the 300 participants, 41 (13.67%) chose the
prosocial task, 197 (65.67%) chose the humorous
task, and 62 (20.67%) chose the random option
(95% CI of proportion of random option: [0.16,
0.25]). Thus, a contingent of participants chose the
random option instead of making a choice for
themselves.
Who Sorts Into the Random Option
We next tested whether those who originally
preferred either a prosocial or a self-interested
option (i.e., those who did not equally prefer both
tasks) would choose the random option. Overall, 55
(18.33%) preferred the prosocial task (prefer-
ence < 50), 240 (80.0%) preferred the humorous task
(preference > 50), and 5 (1.67%) indicated that they
equally preferred both options (preference = 50)
(Table 1). A chi-square test revealed that the distribu-
tion of actual choice was signiﬁcantly different from
original preferences, v2(2, N = 300) = 661.07, p < .001.
Further analyses revealed that participants were
more likely to choose the random option than pre-
dicted by their original preferences, z = 7.39,
p < .001. Participants were less likely to choose both
the humorous task, z = 4.0, p < .001, and the proso-
cial task, z = 2.03, p = .04, when given the random
option than predicted by original preferences. Thus,
participants chose the random option despite having
preferences for either the self-interested option or the
prosocial option. For the speciﬁc breakdown of ﬁnal
choice by original preference (e.g., how many of
those who originally preferred the self-interested task
ultimately chose the random option), see Appendix.
Rate of Prosocial Behavior
Next, we tested whether adding a random
option affected the rate of prosocial behavior by
comparing outcomes to original preferences. To cal-
culate the rate of prosocial behavior, we assumed
that those who chose the random option would be
evenly distributed between the two tasks. In this
study and all subsequent studies, we used the
expected outcomes for those who chose the random
option (i.e., the expected rate of prosocial behavior
with random assignment) to prevent our dependent
measure (i.e., prosocial behavior) from being subject
to randomly skewed outcomes. Results based on
actual random assignments for all studies are
included in the Appendix; in all cases, signiﬁcance
levels remained the same as those obtained when
Table 1
Predicted Choice Versus Actual Choice in Study 1
Predicted choice Actual choice
Prosocial task 18.33% (55) 13.67% (41)
Random option 1.67% (5) 20.67% (62)
Humorous task 80% (240) 65.67% (197)
Total 100% (300) 100% (300)
Note. Before being given the random option, participants indi-
cated their initial preference on a 0–100 sliding scale (0 = much
prefer prosocial, 50 = equal preference, 100 = much prefer humorous
task). Participants were coded as predicted to choose the random
option if they were originally indifferent (50), the prosocial task
if they originally preferred the prosocial task (0–49), and the
humorous task if they preferred the humorous task (51–100).
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using expected outcomes. Thus, half of the 20.67%
of participants who chose the random option were
expected to complete the prosocial task (10.33%);
adding this to the original 13.67% who chose the
prosocial task led to 24.00% completing the proso-
cial task (Figure 1). We tested whether this differed
from what was predicted by original preferences.
To calculate this, we summed half of the 1.67%
who were indifferent between the two options
(0.84%) and the original 18.33% who indicated a
preference for the prosocial task. Thus, original
preferences predicted that 19.17% would complete
the prosocial task. Comparing this to the 24.00%
based on participants’ actual choices, participants’
original preferences did not predict a signiﬁcantly
different rate of prosocial behavior from actual
choice (z = 1.4, p = .15).
Feelings of Conﬂict
Finally, we wished to test whether the preference
for the random option was a result of feeling torn
between the prosocial and self-interested options.
As a manipulation check, we ﬁrst ensured that
indeed the length of the prosocial task predicted
feelings of being torn. We regressed feeling torn on
the length of the prosocial task and found, as
predicted, that as the length of the prosocial task
increased, torn feelings decreased, b = .26,
t(298) = 2.59, p = .01. Further, there was a signiﬁ-
cant effect on preference such that the longer the
prosocial task was, the more participants preferred
the humorous task, b = 17.42, t(297) = 11.44,
p < .001.
Employing a binomial logistic regression, we
regressed the likelihood of choosing the random
outcome on the length of the prosocial task. As pre-
dicted, as the prosocial task became longer people
were less likely to choose the random option,
B = 0.62, SE = 0.16, p < .001. Thus, participants
were more likely to choose the random option
when the prosocial task was shorter (i.e., when the
conﬂict was at its highest). Importantly, as
expected, a bootstrapping mediation analysis (5,000
simulations) revealed that the effect of the length of
the prosocial task on the choice of the random
option was mediated by how torn people felt; as
the task became longer, participants felt less torn
and therefore were less likely to choose the random
option, 95% CI: [0.011, 0.078].
Discussion
In Study 1, we found that when given the choice
between a prosocial and a self-interested option,
some people choose to be randomly assigned their
outcome. Furthermore, more people chose the ran-
dom option than their original preferences would
have predicted (i.e., more participants chose the
random option than indicated being indifferent
between the two options). We also found that those
who chose the random option were both those who
would have engaged in self-interested behavior and
those who would have engaged in prosocial behav-
ior. Importantly, the overall rate of prosocial giving
was not diminished by the addition of a random
option. Finally, the choice of random outcome was
more likely to occur when there was a higher level
of conﬂict between the prosocial and self-interested
options, and was due to feeling torn between them.
This suggests that participants were not simply
being drawn to the random choice by chance, or
interested in the novelty of the random option.
Study 2
In Study 2, we employed a between-subjects design
in which participants were either given a random
option or not. Further, we sought to examine the
effect of having a random option on consumer wel-
fare. Speciﬁcally, we examined whether having a
random option could lower dissatisfaction associ-
ated with choice. We argue that both those who
would have chosen to engage in prosocial behavior
and those who would have chosen to engage in
self-interested behavior shift to a randomoption so that
they can satisfy their preference for the self-interested
option without the accompanying self-reproach. We
therefore predicted that the random option would
make consumers feel less dissatisﬁed with their
choice.
Figure 1. Expected outcome of participants’ choices in Study 1.
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Method
Participants
We aimed to collect 400 participants from Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk and stopped collecting data
when this request was ﬁlled by Amazon, resulting
in 429 participants (Mage = 36.55; 205 male, 223
female) who participated in this study in exchange
for $0.50.
Procedure
In a between-subjects design, participants were
randomly assigned to either a random option condi-
tion or control condition. In the control condition,
participants were asked to choose between the
prosocial and humorous tasks from Study 1 (evalu-
ate informational pamphlet for The Water Project
vs. read humorous anecdote), but they were not
informed how long either task would take (although
participants might have assumed that the prosocial
task would take longer, as the description made it
seem like a more in-depth task). Participants in the
random option condition were asked to choose
between these two tasks as well, but were given a
third option to be randomly assigned to one of these
tasks. In both conditions, before making their
choice, participants were asked how difﬁcult they
found the decision to be, how conﬂicted they felt,
how frustrated they felt having to choose between
the two (or three) options, and how trapped they
felt having to choose between the two (or three)
options, all on 5-point scales (1 = not at all, 5 = ex-
tremely). Measures were derived from previous
research designed to test decision difﬁculty (e.g.,
Evans, Dillon, & Rand, 2015; Haynes, 2009) with the
exception of the “trapped” item, which we included
for its theoretical relevance to our current hypothe-
sis (i.e., that the random option would make partici-
pants feel less trapped between two outcomes). We
combined these to form one measure of choice con-
ﬂict (ɑ = 0.81). In addition, participants indicated
how much they liked or disliked the two (or three)
options that they were given on a 7-point scale
(1 = dislike extremely, 7 = like extremely) as an overall
attitude measure toward their choice set (Krosnick
& Fabrigar, 1997). They then also indicated how
appealing the humorous anecdote choice, The Water
Project choice, and the random assignment choice
(in the random option condition only) were on a
7-point scale (1 = extremely unappealing, 7 = ex-
tremely appealing) (Zaichkowsky, 1985).
Participants then made a choice as described.
Before completing the task, they indicated how
certain they were that they made the right choice and
how conﬁdent they felt about their choice (1 = not at
all, 5 = extremely) (adapted from attitude certainty lit-
erature; e.g., Petrocelli, Tormala, & Rucker, 2007).
They then indicated how much they felt the follow-
ing about their choice: happy, satisﬁed, dissatisﬁed,
guilty, ashamed, and proud (1 = not at all, 5 = ex-
tremely). Guilt, shame, and pride measures were
extracted from the PANAS (Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) as the self-conscious emotion mea-
sures (Tangney, 1999; Tangney & Fischer, 1995).
Happiness, satisfaction, and dissatisfaction were pri-
marily added to disguise the focus of our research,
but were analyzed as a secondary interest. A factor
analysis on these items with varimax rotation
revealed two factors with eigenvalues >1. Factor 1
was composed of the negative items (guilty,
ashamed, and dissatisﬁed), and Factor 2 was com-
posed of the positive items (happy, satisﬁed, and
proud). We noted that, whereas guilt and shame
loaded highly on Factor 1 (0.83 and 0.98 respec-
tively), dissatisfaction did not load as highly (0.50).
Similarly, whereas happiness and satisfaction loaded
highly on Factor 2 (0.89 and 0.84 respectively), pride
did not load as highly (0.57). Furthermore, we had a
priori intended to analyze the negative self-conscious
emotions as our primary focus, because guilt and
shame are considered the major moral self-conscious
emotions that are felt when violating internal or
external moral standards of behavior (Tangney,
1999; Tangney & Fischer, 1995). They thus were most
relevant to our theoretical interest in moral self-
reproach, and so we combined them to create one
measure of moral self-reproach (r = .83).
We expected that those who would have chosen
the self-interested option with high self-reproach
would instead choose the random option, leading
to lower self-reproach. We also analyzed dissatisfac-
tion separately because those who would have cho-
sen the prosocial task should feel less dissatisﬁed,
but not less moral self-reproach, when given a ran-
dom option. That is, those who would have chosen
the prosocial task to avoid self-reproach would
have felt dissatisﬁed about it, and would therefore
opt for the random option, leading them to feel less
dissatisﬁed. However, their moral self-reproach
should not be reduced because it would have
already been low if they had chosen the prosocial
option. Thus, we predicted that people would feel
less moral self-reproach and less dissatisfaction after
being offered a random option. We were agnostic
as to whether people would also actively feel more
positive about their decision (i.e., proud, happy,
satisﬁed) when offered a random option.
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Participants responded to the same open-ended
questions as in Study 1 and indicated their gender,
age, and how often they volunteer.
Results
Choice of Random Option
Of the 223 participants given a random option,
48 (21.52%) chose it (95% CI of proportion: [0.16,
0.27]).
Who Sorts into the Random Option
Participants in the random option condition were
less likely to choose the humorous task (148 of 223;
66.37%) than those in the control condition (160 of
206; 77.67%), z = 2.60, p = .009. Participants in the
random option condition were also less likely to
choose the prosocial task (27 of 223; 12.11%) than
those in the control condition (46 of 206; 22.33%),
z = 2.82, p = .005. Thus, as a conceptual replication
of Study 1, we found that both those who
would have complied with the request and those
who would have refused it opted for the random
option.
Rate of Prosocial Behavior
We used the same calculations as in Study 1 to
determine ﬁnal rates of prosocial behavior. We
found that the proportion of people who eventually
engaged in the prosocial task did not differ across
the random option condition (22.87%) and the con-
trol condition (22.33%), ns.
Subsequent Self-Reproach
We ﬁrst examined how much self-reproach (us-
ing the composite of guilt and shame) participants
felt about their decisions across the two conditions.
We regressed self-reproach onto condition and
found that participants felt less self-reproach after
their choice in the random option condition (M = 1.22
SD = 0.62) than after their choice in the control
condition (M = 1.38, SD = 0.73), t(427) = 2.44,
p = .015.
To examine what was driving this main effect,
we examined participants’ self-reproach depending
on the decisions they made in the two conditions.
To do this, we regressed self-reproach onto choice,
condition, and their interaction.1 There was a signif-
icant effect of the choice by condition interaction on
self-reproach, t(424) = 2.33, p = .021 (Figure 2),
such that participants’ choice of humorous vs.
prosocial task affected their self-reproach differently
depending on whether they were given a random
choice option or not. Speciﬁcally, those who did not
have a random option felt higher self-reproach
when they chose the humorous task (M = 1.47,
SD = 0.79) than when they chose the prosocial task
(M = 1.04, SD = 0.23), t(424) = 3.85, p < .001. How-
ever, participants in the random option condition
felt equal self-reproach when they chose the prosocial
task (M = 1.19, SD = 0.68) as when they chose the
humorous task (M = 1.20, SD = 0.55), t(424) = 0.10,
p = .92. Decomposed differently, those in the control
condition felt more moral self-reproach about choos-
ing the humorous task than those in the random
option condition, t(424) = 3.60, p < .001. However,
those in the control condition did not feel a signiﬁ-
cantly different level of moral self-reproach about
choosing the prosocial task than those in the random
option condition, t(424) = 0.88, p = .38. This suggests
that those in the random option condition who
would have chosen the humorous task, but would
have felt high levels of self-reproach about it, opted
instead to choose the random option, which led to
lower levels of self-reproach. Indeed, we found that
those in the random option condition who chose to
be assigned to a random outcome felt equally low
self-reproach (M = 1.29, SD = 0.79) as those who
chose to engage in the humorous task, t(424) = 0.84,
p = .40, and prosocial task, t(424) = 0.67, p = .51.
Choice Dissatisfaction
We analyzed the dissatisfaction item separately
from the other negative self-conscious emotions (see
procedure section for a discussion of the reasoning
of this approach). Participants felt less dissatisﬁed
with their decisions when they had a random
Figure 2. Moral self-reproach by condition and choice in Study 2.
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option (M = 1.16, SD = 0.54) than when they did
not (M = 1.27, SD = 0.68), t(427) = 1.94, p = .053.
Although the interaction between choice and con-
dition on dissatisfaction was not signiﬁcant,
t(424) = 1.35, p = .18, we examined what drove
this dissatisfaction. Of relevance here, we tested
whether those who chose the prosocial task felt less
dissatisﬁed when given a random option than
when not given a random option. Our theory sug-
gests that those who would have chosen the proso-
cial task to avoid self-reproach would have felt
dissatisﬁed about this decision and would also have
opted for a random choice. Thus, we expected the
average dissatisfaction of those who chose the
prosocial task would be lower when given a ran-
dom option. However, we did not ﬁnd evidence for
this (Mrandom = 1.26, SDrandom = 0.71; Mcontrol =
1.24, SDcontrol = 0.71), t(424) = 0.136, p = .89 (to be
elaborated on in the discussion of the study). The
effect of choice condition on dissatisfaction instead
largely mirrored the effect on self-reproach: those
who chose the humorous task were less dissatisﬁed
in the random option condition (M = 1.08,
SD = 0.40) than the control condition (M = 1.28,
SD = 0.67), t(424) = 2.88, p = .004. In line with
this, a bootstrap mediation analysis (5,000 samples)
revealed that the overall effect of choice condition
on dissatisfaction was mediated by moral self-
reproach, 95% CI: [0.13, 0.01].
Feeling of Conﬂict
We expected participants to feel less conﬂicted
when given a random option. However, we found
no signiﬁcant difference between the random
option condition (M = 1.40, SD = 0.60) and the con-
trol condition (M = 1.45, SD = 0.65), t(427) = 0.93,
p = .35, which we elaborate on (along with other
null ﬁndings) in the discussion of this study. We
therefore tested whether conﬂict predicted choice of
the random option in the random option condition,
as it did in Study 1. A binomial logistic regression
revealed that those who felt more conﬂicted were
indeed more likely to choose the random option,
B = .59, SE = 0.25, p = .017.
Discussion
In Study 2, we conceptually replicated the ﬁndings
of Study 1 and additionally found that offering an
option to be randomly assigned between a proso-
cial and a self-interested task increased consumer
welfare by lowering moral self-reproach after
making a decision. Our data indicate that those
who would have otherwise chosen the self-inter-
ested option but would have felt particularly high
moral self-reproach were able to shift their choice
to the random option to remove their agency from
the choice. Furthermore, we found that feelings of
conﬂict predicted whether people chose the random
outcome, supporting the experimental evidence in
Study 1.
Somewhat unexpectedly, participants did not feel
less conﬂicted when they had the ability to select
the random option (see Appendix for descriptive
statistics). Furthermore, they did not feel more cer-
tain or conﬁdent that they had made the right deci-
sion after the fact. Although we do not have
empirical evidence to support this, it is possible that
participants felt less conﬂicted because they were
given a random option, but also felt more conﬂicted
simply due to the number of choices given, or for
other reasons, such as having a general distaste for
risk (Simonsohn, 2009). In addition, our theory
would predict that those who would have begrudg-
ingly chosen the prosocial option would switch to
the random option, leaving them less dissatisﬁed.
However, we did not ﬁnd that participants felt less
dissatisﬁed about choosing the prosocial option
when they were given a random option than when
they were not. It is possible that people in the con-
trol condition did not wish to admit to feeling dis-
satisﬁed about engaging in prosocial behavior, but
wished instead to take moral credit for their choice
(Lin, Zlatev, & Miller, 2017). Also, given the low
rates of people directly choosing the prosocial task,
it is possible that there was insufﬁcient power to
detect the effect if one existed.
Furthermore, although participants in the ran-
dom option condition felt less negative (due to the
alleviation of the self-reproach of those who would
have chosen to engage in self-interested behavior),
we did not ﬁnd evidence that participants also felt
more positive (i.e., happier, more satisﬁed, or prou-
der) about their choice in the random choice condi-
tion. This suggests that people feel ambivalent (i.e.,
both negative and positive, Reich & Wheeler, 2016;
Thompson & Zanna, 1995) about engaging in
prosocial behavior and that choosing to be ran-
domly assigned only makes people feel less self-
reproach about not engaging in prosocial behavior,
but it does not make them feel more positive about
the idea of actually engaging in prosocial behavior.
Overall, this study provided evidence that add-
ing a random option can increase consumer wel-
fare without sacriﬁcing actual rates of prosocial
behavior.
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Study 3
People often face prosocial requests not only once,
but repeatedly. For instance, those who tend to
shop at the same grocery stores may be asked to
donate each time they check out; those who walk
down the same streets might run into solicitors
from the same organizations asking them to spare a
minute of their time. Thus, in Study 3, we sought
to test participants’ choice of the random option
over time. We hypothesized that it is not simply
novelty that attracts participants to the random
option, but rather it is the way in which the ran-
dom option helps resolve psychological conﬂict.
Thus, we hypothesized that the preference for the
random option would remain even after repeated
requests.
Method
Participants
We aimed to recruit 300 participants for this
study from Amazon Mechanical Turk and stopped
data collection once this request was ﬁlled by Ama-
zon, resulting in 301 participants (Mage = 29.97; 193
male, 108 female). Participants were paid $0.50 for
participating in the study and a $0.50 bonus if they
participated in the follow-up study.
Procedure
Participants chose between the same two tasks
as Studies 1 and 2, except the times were set at
6 min for the prosocial task and 5 min for the
humorous task. As mentioned in the introduction,
we operationalize a burdensome action as one that
requires ﬁnancial, cognitive and/or temporal
resources. Here, we made the task both more difﬁ-
cult and unambiguously longer. As MTurk workers
generally seek simple tasks with high payout per
amount of time (Ipeirotis, 2010), we reasoned that
this would ensure that the prosocial task would be
seen as burdensome. However, we kept the timing
of the prosocial task close to the timing of the
humorous task (6 vs. 5 min) so that participants
would still feel conﬂicted between the tasks (given
that participants grew less conﬂicted when the task
was extremely long in Study 1). Again, participants
in the control condition simply chose between the
two tasks whereas those in the random option con-
dition were additionally given the option to be ran-
domly assigned their outcome. At the end of the
ﬁrst study, participants were asked whether they
would like to participate in a subsequent study that
would be emailed to them in 1 week for a bonus
payment of $0.50. They were asked to provide an
email address if they wished to participate in the
study and were assured that the email would be
used only to send the second study and that details
of their records would not be kept.
After 1 week, those who reported their email
addresses received a link to the new study. In the
instructions, they were told they could again choose
between two different tasks and were told (in large,
bold, italicized font) that although the descriptions
looked similar, the content of the tasks would be
different from those completed in Part 1 of the
study. They then read descriptions of the two tasks:
evaluating the website content (as opposed to a
pamphlet) for The Water Project or evaluating a
humorous anecdote. Those originally in the random
option condition again received the random option,
whereas those originally in the control condition
did not. Participants then completed the study as
described and answered a few free response ques-
tions about how they felt about their outcome and
about the study in general. Finally, participants
indicated gender, age, and how often they volun-
teer per month.
Results
Part 1 Choice of Random Option
In the ﬁrst part of the study, we found that of the
151 participants given the random option, 54
(35.76%) chose it (95% CI of proportion: [0.28, 0.43]).
Who Sorts into the Random Option in Part 1
Participants in the random option condition were
less likely to choose the humorous task (82 of 151;
54.30%) than those in the control condition (115 of
150; 76.67%), z = 4.08, p < .001. Participants in the
random option condition were also less likely to
choose the prosocial task (15 of 151; 9.93%) than
those in the control condition (35 of 115; 23.33%),
z = 3.12, p = .002. This again indicated that both
those who would have complied with the request
and those who would have refused it opted for a
random option.
Part 1 Rate of Prosocial Behavior
As before, we conﬁrmed that the rate of people
who eventually engaged in the prosocial task was
not signiﬁcantly lower in the random option
10 Lin and Reich
condition (27.81%) than in the control condition
(23.33%), z = .89, p = .37.
Part 2 Choice of Random Option
Two hundred and sixteen participants engaged
in the second half of the study with no evidence of
uneven attrition across conditions (z = 0.67,
p = .50). Of the 111 participants given a random
option, 38 (34.23%) chose it (95% CI of proportion:
[0.25, 0.43]). Thus, even in a repeated choice con-
text, a similar proportion of participants chose the
random option.
Who Sorts into the Random Option in Part 2
Participants in the random option condition were
less likely to choose the humorous task (65 of 111;
58.56%) than those in the control condition (91 of
105; 86.67%), z = 4.61, p < .001. This time, those in
the random option condition were not signiﬁcantly
less likely to choose the prosocial task (eight of 111;
7.21%) than those in the control condition (14 of
105; 13.33%), z = 1.49, p = .14. Thus, in this part,
those who chose the random option seemed mostly
to be those who would have chosen the humorous
task in a traditional choice context.
Part 2 Rate of Prosocial Behavior
In Part 2, participants were more likely to
engage in the prosocial task in the random option
condition (24.43%) than in the control condition
(13.33%), z = 2.06, p = .039 (Figure 3). This seems
driven by the fact that the rate of prosocial behav-
ior dropped in the control condition (23.33%–
13.33%), whereas the rate of prosocial behavior
remained similar when there was a random option
(27.81%–24.43%).
Discussion
In this study, we found not only that people were
still attracted to the random option under repeated
choice, but that upon second asking, they were
more likely to engage in prosocial behavior when
they had a random option than when they did not.
While we do not argue this would carry over to
any context, this suggests that adding a random
option might increase prosocial behavior over time.
Furthermore, of those who chose the random
option in the second part of the study, 60.53% had
chosen the random option in the ﬁrst part, 26.32%
had chosen the self-interested option, and 13.16%
had chosen the prosocial option (see Appendix
Table A4). This suggests that the random option
remains attractive to those who originally chose it,
and it may also attract people who had previously
chosen other options. Delving even deeper, of the
23 participants who chose the random option twice,
both those who were originally assigned the proso-
cial option (10 participants, 43.48%) and those who
were originally assigned the self-interested option
(13 participants, 56.52%) chose the random option.
This suggests that the attraction to the random
option was not driven by people who were
assigned a certain outcome (e.g., those who were
assigned to engage in the self-interested option feel-
ing that they should take a chance because they
“owe” a prosocial behavior).
The higher rate of prosocial behavior in Part 2 of
the study seemed due to the fact that some partici-
pants who originally engaged in prosocial behavior
in the control condition switched to a self-interested
option in Part 2, whereas rates of prosocial behav-
ior remained stable in the random option condition.
One potential explanation for this is that those who
engage in prosocial behavior to avoid moral self-
reproach are less likely to repeat this behavior in
the future (e.g., Hadesstrom & Johansson, 2016),
which accounts for the drop-off rate of givers from
the ﬁrst and second parts of the study in the control
condition. It is precisely these types of people who
we argue are attracted to the random option.
Another possibility is that a random option leads to
lowered reactance; that is, reactance theory suggests
that strong appeals for help and feelings of obliga-
tion to help can sometimes lead people to be less
Figure 3. Percentage ultimately engaging in prosocial task in Part
1 and Part 2 of the study as a function of condition in Study 3.
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likely to help due to a feeling of constrained psy-
chological freedom (Berkowitz, 1973; Brehm, 1966).
This reactance might be particularly strong in situa-
tions in which people have already engaged in
prosocial behavior once and are asked to do so
again. One way to lessen this constraint might be to
offer a random option, which gives more choice
freedom and feels like a less “strong” request, espe-
cially in repeated requests.
Study 4
In Study 4, we sought to expand the scope of our
examination by testing the preference for the ran-
dom option in monetary donations rather than in
volunteering. Further, we examined the preference
for the random option within a range of outcomes
instead of a binary (yes or no) outcome. When
checking out while shopping, organizations often
ask consumers to donate to a charitable cause by
choosing from a range of outcomes, for example,
rounding their total up to the nearest dollar, donat-
ing $1.00, or donating $5.00. Other organizations
simply let consumers choose how much to donate
with an empty text box at checkout (e.g., while
online shopping). In these contexts, consumers face
a conﬂict between paying a high amount and facing
negative self-judgment for paying too little (Gneezy
et al., 2012). As discussed earlier, some consumers
avoid buying products in pay-what-you-want price
schemes when the money will go to charity because
they are concerned about how paying less than the
“appropriate” amount would reﬂect on their proso-
cial self-image (Gneezy et al., 2012). Theoretically,
these consumers should be attracted to a random
outcome to mitigate these self-signaling concerns.
Thus, out of both practical importance and theoreti-
cal interest, we examine in Study 4 whether people
would prefer a random outcome when they can
choose how much (if any) to donate. Speciﬁcally, in
the control condition, participants were asked how
much of a $2.00 bonus they would be willing to
donate, if any. In the random option condition,
participants could additionally choose to be
assigned a random amount to donate between $0.00
and $2.00.
In addition to anticipating that a subset of partici-
pants would choose the random option, we expected
that only those who would have refused the request
would be attracted to the random option and not
those who would have complied with the request.
This is because, for those who would have donated,
the outcome of the randomizer would not likely
differ from what they would have chosen to donate
originally. For example, if the randomizer assigned a
value between $0.00 and $2.00, the expected outcome
would be $1.00, which is how much they likely
would have donated (it was the modal donation
amount in this study).
Method
Participants
We aimed to collect 300 participants on Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk and stopped data collection
after Amazon fulﬁlled the request, resulting in 322
participants (Mage = 37.40, 158 male, 163 female,
one other).
Procedure
Participants ﬁrst completed an unrelated study
pertaining to everyday consumption decisions. At
the end of the study, they were told they would
also receive a $2.00 bonus for completing the study
and that they may decide to keep the bonus or
donate any amount of it to St. Jude’s Children’s
Hospital. In the control condition, participants
could choose an amount to donate (an option that
read “donate amount below,” with a text box
underneath) or could choose not to donate. In the
random option condition, in addition to these two
options, participants could choose to be randomly
assigned a donation amount between $0 and $2.00.
Afterward, participants indicated how they felt
about their choice on the same post-choice scales as
Study 2 (guilty, ashamed, happy, satisﬁed, dissatis-
ﬁed, proud). A factor analysis with varimax rota-
tion revealed the same two factors, with Factor 1
comprising the negative items and Factor 2 com-
prising the positive items. For Factor 1, guilt and
shame again loaded strongly as in Study 2 (0.85
and 0.93, respectively), and dissatisfaction also
loaded fairly strongly (0.78). For Factor 2, happiness
and satisfaction loaded strongly (0.91 and 0.87,
respectively) while pride loaded less strongly (0.67).
For the same theoretical reasons we listed in Study
2, we focused on guilt and shame as our main
dependent measure (r = .83). The reasoning behind
the separate dissatisfaction analysis was not rele-
vant here, because we did not expect those who
would have chosen to donate to switch to the ran-
dom option. Dissatisfaction and other results are
reported in the Appendix.
After responding to these measures, participants
were informed that we were only interested in
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their preference, and thus their choice was only
hypothetical.
Results
Choice of Random Option
Of the 165 participants given the random option,
25 (15.15%) chose it (95% CI of proportion: [0.10,
0.21]). As with choices with binary outcomes, a con-
tingent of participants was attracted to the random
option.
Who Sorts into the Random Option
As before, we found that participants in the ran-
dom option condition were less likely to choose not
to donate at all (67 of 165; 40.61%) than those in the
control condition (88 of 157; 56.05%), z = 2.77,
p = .005. Furthermore, as expected, participants were
not less likely to donate a ﬁxed amount in the ran-
dom option condition (73 of 165; 44.24%) than those
in the control condition (69 of 157; 43.95%), z = 0.05,
p = .96. In contrast to binary choice contexts, this
suggests that those who chose the random option
were those who would have counterfactually chosen
not to donate at all and not those who would have
donated a ﬁxed amount.
Donation Amount
We also tested whether participants gave more on
average when they had the random option. Following
the reasoning in previous studies, we used the
expected value of the random outcome rather than
the observed randomly assigned values. Thus, for
every participant who selected the random outcome,
we assigned him or her the value of a $1.00 donation,
the expected outcome over time of random assign-
ments between $0.00 and $2.00. We found that partic-
ipants in the random option condition donated
marginally more (M = $0.57, SD = 0.64) than those
in the control condition (M = $0.45, SD = 0.65),
t(320) = 1.75, p = .081. Of those who chose to donate
a ﬁxed amount, those in the random option condition
did not donate signiﬁcantly more or less than those in
the control condition (Mrandom = $0.96, SD = 0.64;
Mcontrol = $1.03, SD = 0.60), t(139) = 0.71, p = .48.
Subsequent Self-Reproach
Unlike Study 2, participants did not feel more
moral self-reproach in the control condition
(M = 1.47, SD = 0.80) than in the random option
condition (M = 1.41, SD = 0.72), t(320) = 0.70,
p = .49. We also did not ﬁnd an interaction between
condition and choice (donating a ﬁxed amount vs. no
donation) on moral self-reproach, F(1, 317) = .24,
p = .62. We did, however, ﬁnd a main effect of choice
on moral self-reproach, such that those who did not
donate felt more self-reproach (M = 1.66, SD = 0.90)
than both those who donated a ﬁxed amount
(M = 1.24, SD = 0.54), t(319) = 5.00, p < .001, and
those who chose the random option (M = 1.20,
SD = 0.50), t(319) = 2.94, p = .003 (Figure 4). Those
who chose to donate a ﬁxed amount or a random
option did not differ in self-reproach, t(319) = 0.25,
p = .80. Although we did not observe a main effect
between the random option condition and the con-
trol condition, this pattern should emerge with a lar-
ger sample size if the pattern of results we observed
here remains consistent.
Discussion
In this study, we found that people who had the
opportunity to donate a random amount were more
likely to donate, and thus donated marginally more
money, than those who had to choose an amount
to give (if any). Importantly, the outcome of the
random amount option is completely contained
within the choice; participants could have chosen
the outcome rather than choosing the random
option. However, in these prosocial contexts, con-
sumers are conﬂicted between paying a high
amount and incurring self-judgment for paying too
little (Gneezy et al., 2012). Thus, in this study, we
found that participants could resolve this conﬂict
by choosing to donate a random amount, which
indeed resulted in lower feelings of moral self-
reproach than not donating at all.
Figure 4. Moral self-reproach by choice and condition in Study 4.
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Our results in this study on moral self-reproach
were not an exact replication of the pattern of
results found in Study 2, in which participants in
the random option condition who chose not to
donate felt less moral self-reproach than those in
the control condition. In Study 4, those in the ran-
dom option condition who chose not to donate at
all still felt higher moral self-reproach than those
who chose the random option. However, these
results are consistent with the idea that allowing
for a random option attracts those who would not
have otherwise donated and also decreases moral
self-reproach among those people as a result.
Although speculative, it is possible that the differ-
ence between these two studies might have
occurred because refusing to engage in a burden-
some task was more justiﬁable (e.g., “I probably
wouldn’t give good enough feedback to be helpful
to that charity anyway”; Liu & Lin, in press) than
refusing to give up just part of their windfall bonus
to a worthy cause. Indeed, people were generally
more likely to choose the prosocial option in this
study, with 43.95% in the control condition donat-
ing compared to 22.23% choosing the prosocial task
in Study 2. Prior research has shown that people
who act out of self-interest often justify their deci-
sions to protect their moral self-image (Lin et al.,
2017; Shalvi, Gino, Barkan, & Ayal, 2015). Thus,
perhaps those in the random option condition who
chose the self-interested task in Study 2 were only
those who were able to justify their decision, and
those who could not justify that decision shifted to
the random option. In this study, perhaps even
those who chose the self-interested option (i.e., not
donating) could not justify their unambiguous deci-
sion not to donate their money.
Finally, as expected in this study, we found that
only those who would have refused the prosocial
request were drawn to the random option in this
context. Those who would have donated had little
to gain, as their random outcome would likely
match their original intentions. Thus, this is an espe-
cially promising intervention context, as it does not
cannibalize those who would have donated other-
wise. By the same logic, even if this intervention did
cannibalize those who would have donated, it
would still be more likely to lead to increased proso-
cial giving than in binary choice contexts. This is
because those who choose to donate a ﬁxed amount
are likely to donate a moderate amount (in this
study, the modal ﬁxed amount donated was $1.00,
and the mean ﬁxed amount was 0.99, SD = 0.62),
which is similar to the expected value of donation
from a random option.
Study 5
In Study 5, we wished to replicate the effect from
Study 4 in a setting in which money was not
endowed to participants. Although participants in
Study 4 may have felt pressured to donate because
they received a windfall bonus that was large rela-
tive to their payment, participants in this study bet-
ter represent everyday consumers who face
requests to donate their own money to charity. We
asked participants who were exiting behavioral
studies whether they would donate some of their
earnings to a charitable organization. Importantly,
participants were not aware they were partaking in
a study, and their donations were indeed made to
the speciﬁed cause. In the random option condition,
they could choose an amount to donate, choose not
to donate, or choose to be randomly assigned an
amount to donate ($1.00, $2.00, or $3.00), whereas
in the control condition they were not given the
option to be randomly assigned a donation
amount.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited on their way out of
the behavioral lab at a west coast university. We
aimed to collect 300 participants and stopped data
collection once that number was reached
(Mage = 24.64, 100 male, 199 female, one other).
Procedure
Participants were recruited as they were complet-
ing any study being run at the behavioral labora-
tory. At the end of whichever study they were
taking (which paid between $5.00 and $25.00),2 par-
ticipants were directed to collect their payments
from an experimenter who was running the study.
The experimenter asked participants to ﬁll out a
survey before they left. The survey began with their
demographic information (gender and age). On the
next page, they were asked whether they would be
willing to donate some of their earnings to St.
Jude’s Children’s Hospital. In the control condition,
participants were told that if they would like to
donate, they should indicate how much they
wanted to give below (options were: ‘$1,’ ‘$2,’ ‘$3,’
and ‘No Thanks’). In the random option condition,
participants were additionally told that they could
choose to be randomly assigned an amount to
donate ($1, $2, or $3) and were given the
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corresponding choice as part of their choice set. We
used integer amounts in this study because partici-
pants were paid in dollar bills with no change.3
No other measures were collected in this study for
the sake of consistency with the cover story (i.e., to
limit word of mouth about the study). Furthermore,
if we had repeated the self-conscious emotion mea-
sures from earlier, future participants in the waiting
area might witness current participants ﬁlling out a
series of questions following what was ostensibly a
real prosocial request; this might then make them
suspicious of the study’s real purpose. Thus, at the
end of the study, participants were simply given the
amount that the study paid, minus the amount they
chose to donate. Donations were actually made to St.
Jude’s Children’s Hospital on participants’ behalf at
the completion of the study.
Results
Choice of Random Option
Of the 149 participants given the random option,
16 (10.74%) participants chose the random option
(95% CI of proportion: [0.06, 0.16]).
Who sorts into the Random Option
As in Study 4, participants in the random option
condition were less likely to choose not to donate
(101 of 149; 66.89%) than those in the control condi-
tion (116 of 151; 77.85%), z = 1.12, p = .034. As in
Study 4, participants in the random option condi-
tion were not less likely to donate a ﬁxed amount
(34 of 149; 22.82%) than those in the control condi-
tion (33 of 151; 22.15%), z = 0.20, p = .84.
Donation Amount
As before, we assigned participants who selected
the random option the expected outcome of ran-
dom assignment ($2.00). We found that participants
on average donated more in the random option
condition (M = $0.64, SD = 1.01) than in the control
condition (M = $0.42, SD = 0.87), t(298) = 2.06,
p = .040.
Discussion
In this study, we again found that adding a ran-
dom option can decrease self-interested behavior
and even increase the average donation amount.
Importantly, the money here was not endowed—it
was earned by participants for their participation in
a study, in which many participants take part due
to ﬁnancial need; thus, if anything, they should
have felt particularly justiﬁed in not donating their
hard-earned money.
We chose to ask participants whether they
would like to donate before paying them for partic-
ipating in the study in order to mimic a checkout
experience in which participants might be asked to
add a donation onto their payment. Although the
situations are clearly different in that participants
are being paid money rather than spending it, we
believe that this best logistically mimics the process
of an online or in-person checkout during which
this intervention could be implemented. For
instance, participants might be asked to donate
before entering their credit card information, which
is before the ﬁnal exchange is completed. This fur-
thers the ecological validity of this study, and sug-
gests that people may be attracted to a random
option in point-of-sale contexts.
General Discussion
In ﬁve studies, we ﬁnd that when facing a prosocial
request, a contingent of people would prefer to
leave their decision up to chance. That is, some
people prefer choosing to be randomly assigned an
outcome over actively choosing an outcome for
themselves. Furthermore, the preference for a ran-
dom option can occur in binary choices (Studies 1
through 3) as well as in ranges of outcomes (Stud-
ies 4 and 5), and it can increase the rate and
amount of donations in the latter. We ﬁnd evidence
that this choice is driven by feeling conﬂicted
between the prosocial and self-interested options
(Studies 1 and 3). We also ﬁnd that those who
chose the random option were not only those who
equally preferred the prosocial and self-interested
options (Study 1). Indeed, in binary choices, both
those who would have complied with and those
who would have refused the prosocial request
sometimes prefer to be randomly assigned an out-
come (Studies 1 through 3). However, in choices
with a range of outcomes, only those who would
have originally refused the request are attracted to
the random option (Studies 4 and 5). Finally, we
ﬁnd that being given a random option can reduce
feelings of self-reproach in choice (Studies 2 and 4);
we contend that this is because some of those who
would have chosen a self-interested outcome with
high self-reproach choose instead to leave the out-
come up to chance.
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Theoretical Contributions and Practical Implications
Some people comply with prosocial requests for
altruistic reasons (Batson & Shaw, 1991) and others
refuse them without any guilt perhaps because
helping others is not important to them (Aquino &
Reed, 2002). If these were the only two types of
people, then we should not expect people to choose
a random option in prosocial requests. The fact that
we ﬁnd that some prefer a random option identiﬁes
two other types of people: those who comply with
prosocial requests to avoid moral self-reproach and
those who refuse prosocial requests at a moral self-
reproach cost. Our research sheds light on the trap
that prosocial requests set for these two latter
groups: they face a lose-lose situation in which they
must give something up (i.e., resources or moral
self-regard). This suggests that prosocial requests in
themselves can inherently reduce these consumers’
welfare regardless of their overt behavior. Thus,
mass efforts to increase giving likely regularly
reduce consumer welfare, forcing consumers to
reﬂect on their own (im)moral nature.
We further contribute to prior literature on the reli-
ance on chance in decision-making. Although rational
choice theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944)
and prior research (Simonsohn, 2009) suggest that
people have a distaste for random outcomes, other
research has shown that people do sometimes rely
on chance when they are concerned about regretting
their decisions (Dwenger et al., 2012). Leaving an
outcome up to chance removes the feeling of agency
or responsibility about the choice, lowering regret
(Dwenger et al., 2012). We extend this ﬁnding to
prosocial requests, ﬁnding that a contingent of peo-
ple prefer to “ﬂip a coin” to resolve their internal
moral conﬂict. Our context differs from that in previ-
ous research because in the case of prosocial behav-
ior, conﬂict and anticipated regret are necessarily a
result of a different psychological driver. The conﬂict
people feel when facing prosocial requests reﬂects
an ambivalence toward helping others—that is, peo-
ple feel both strongly positive (feeling that they
should help society) but also strongly negative
(wanting to maintain their own resources) (Reich &
Wheeler, 2016; Thompson & Zanna, 1995). This
choice between helping oneself at a cost to others
and helping others at a cost to oneself reﬂects on
people's moral character and can lead to moral self-
conscious emotions (i.e., guilt, shame). This is sub-
stantively different than simply facing a difﬁcult
choice, which merely reﬂects one’s preference and
should not lead to the same affective consequences.
In our case, offering the choice to remove agency
allows us to isolate a preference to engage in self-
interested behavior without accompanying self-
reproach. Understanding the psychological under-
pinnings of this conﬂict might open the door to
other interventions as well. For instance, resolving
ambivalence can occur not only through increasing a
positive attitude toward giving but also through
decreasing a negative attitude toward losing one’s
resources. As an example, soliciting delayed dona-
tions (e.g., automatically withdrawn at some time in
the future) might decrease pain of payment while
leading to higher donations (Andreoni & Serra-Gar-
cia, 2016).
The current research also contributes to previous
work on the preference to randomize outcomes in
moral contexts. In contrast to prior literature that
suggests that people prefer to ﬂip a coin as plausi-
ble deniability for choosing self-interested behavior
(Batson et al., 1999), we ﬁnd that people sometimes
prefer to rely on chance even when they must
adhere to it. For those who would have engaged in
self-interested behavior with this moral self-
reproach cost, some are willing to risk actually
engaging in prosocial behavior if it means they
have a chance to obtain a self-interested outcome
(e.g., not volunteering or donating very little) with-
out incurring the self-reproach cost. This shifts ini-
tially self-interested consumers to relatively more
prosocial behavior, resulting in a lower rate of
purely self-interested behavior. In binary choices
speciﬁcally, we also found that those who would
have engaged in prosocial behavior in order to
avoid moral self-reproach are sprung from the con-
ﬁnes of their self-reproach and allowed to indulge
in the possibility of achieving a self-interested out-
come without needing to choose it. Thus, we add
to prior literature (Dana et al., 2007) by demonstrat-
ing a clear preference for random choice in proso-
cial contexts and by showing that both those who
would have refused and those who would have
complied with prosocial requests sort into the ran-
dom option.
Our research also has promising practical implica-
tions. In binary outcomes, such as whether or not to
volunteer, we found that our intervention improves
consumer welfare without decreasing prosocial
behavior and perhaps even increases prosocial behav-
ior in repeated choice contexts. Furthermore, it is pos-
sible that adding a random option in binary outcomes
could prevent prosocial request avoidance and thus
improve outcomes both for prosocial organizations
and consumers. Some people respond to being
trapped between a self-interested and a prosocial
option by avoiding the choice altogether (Lin et al.,
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2016). This avoidance leads to fewer donations to the
prosocial organization and even leads consumers to
forgo self-interested outcomes (e.g., people avoid a
choice between a fun task they would enjoy and a
prosocial task, thereby forgoing the opportunity to
engage in the fun task). This latter ﬁnding also sug-
gests possible negative outcomes for partner organi-
zations, such as grocery stores that ask people to
donate at checkout—people may decide that purchas-
ing a product from the store is not worth facing the
decision to comply with or refuse a prosocial request.
Our ﬁndings suggest that offering a random option in
binary choice might reduce avoidance of the decision,
which may lead to higher rates of prosocial giving.
Furthermore, in decisions with ranges of outcomes,
such as donating $1.00, $2.00, or $3.00, we found that
a random option has the potential to increase dona-
tions, as it does not reduce the rate of consumers
choosing to donate a set amount.
Limitations and Future Directions
This work focuses on the preference for the ran-
dom option in the context of direct requests, rather
than in unsolicited donation contexts. Accordingly,
the relatively low rates of prosocial behavior in our
studies (between 13.67% and 43.95%) are closer to
prosocial behavior in the context of responses to
direct requests, such as donation at point of sale. In
previous research in which people are directly
asked to donate small amounts in ﬁeld settings,
rates of giving have been low (e.g., around 10%;
Andreoni et al., 2017). However, when consumers
make unsolicited donations, they should not face
the same psychological conﬂict, as they have
actively decided to support a charitable cause.
Indeed, consumers seem to prefer making unso-
licited donations (Zinsmeister, 2015). Thus, our
ﬁndings should be considered relevant to giving in
the context of direct requests, rather than general-
ized to contexts in which people make unsolicited
donations.
Across the studies, a minority of participants
chose the random option (between 11% and 36%).
Although absolute rates of choosing the random
option were low, they were sometimes comparable
to or even higher than the predicted rate of proso-
cial behavior (Study 1) or the rate of prosocial
behavior in the control conditions (Studies 2 and 3).
Notably, the size of the group choosing the random
option seems qualitatively lower in Studies 4 and 5
(15.15% and 10.74%, respectively). It is possible that
the random option is less appealing in choices with
a range of outcomes, as participants who wish to
compromise between self-interested and prosocial
behavior already do so by giving some amount in
the middle of the range. Future work could exam-
ine this possibility.
Future research might also investigate whether
people who encounter a random option repeatedly
over a long period of time would adjust away from
choosing the random option. Study 3 suggests that
the interest in the random option remains attractive
over a short period of time (1 week), with one
repeated ask. Furthermore, in Study 3, the random
option actually offset attrition of prosocial behavior
that was observed in the control condition. Recent
research suggests that people who donate to avoid
moral self-reproach are less likely to repeat this
behavior in the future (e.g., Hadesstrom & Johans-
son, 2016). We posit that these types of people may
instead be attracted to the random option, leading
them to choose this option repeatedly (instead of
giving once and then never giving again). Choosing
the random option repeatedly would allow them to
always escape the self-reproach from refusing a
prosocial request. However, it is possible that with
frequent exposure people would eventually learn
that they donate the average amount over time (or
half the time, in binary outcomes) and thus cease to
choose it. Whether people will continue to choose
the random option over a long period of time and
the ideal frequency of exposure to a random option
remain to be examined further.
To contribute to an overall theoretical under-
standing of the psychological drivers of choosing
the random option, it would be worthwhile to
identify conditions under which the propensity to
choose the random option would be higher versus
lower. For instance, people may not wish to leave
a high stakes situation up to chance (e.g., if the
donation amounts are higher). They may instead
have a stronger preference for avoiding the bur-
densome action, or receiving moral credit (from
themselves and others) for selﬂessly engaging in
the prosocial action (Zlatev & Miller, 2016). It
would also be informative to examine whether
people would be more likely to choose the ran-
dom outcome privately (e.g., via keypad or online)
than publicly (e.g., having to directly tell a cashier
that they would like a random option). In support
of our theorizing that people wish to avoid moral
self-reproach rather than other-reproach, we ﬁnd
that participants do select the random option
when the choice is relatively unobserved (e.g.,
online). Although people may be additionally con-
cerned about public appearances, this concern may
not increase the choice of the random option. In
Choosing Chance Under Moral Conﬂict 17
fact, consumers may feel that selecting the random
option would still reﬂect poorly on them, as it
expresses an internal uncertainty about whether to
engage in prosocial behavior. Indeed, our lowest
rate of donation was in Study 5 (10.74%), in which
participants had to interact directly with an experi-
menter to be paid. Thus, future research may
directly manipulate whether one’s decision is
observable to others or not; if participants were to
choose the random option more often when unob-
served, this would be evidence that those choosing
the random option are mostly those internally con-
ﬂicted between self-interest and self-reproach (as
opposed to other-reproach). In addition, future
research may directly manipulate the desire to
avoid self-reproach to provide further mechanistic
evidence. For instance, participants who are previ-
ously morally licensed (Khan & Dhar, 2006; Mer-
ritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010) should feel they can
refuse a prosocial request without self-reproach
and thus be less likely to choose the random
option (and more likely to simply refuse the
request).
It may also be illuminating to identify character-
istics of the consumers who choose the random
option. One theoretically relevant possibility is that
these consumers have high self-discrepancies
between their standards of behavior and their
actual behavior—in particular, a discrepancy
between who they are and who they feel like they
ought to be (Higgins, 1987). In our case, it is likely
that facing a prosocial request activates self-discre-
pancies (e.g., the feeling that they have failed their
own or society’s moral standards) leading to self-
reproach (Higgins, 1999; Higgins, Shah, & Fried-
man, 1997). Our theory suggests that people choose
the random option to reduce these feelings of self-
reproach, implying that those with high self-discre-
pancies would be more inclined to choose the ran-
dom option.
Conclusion
We ﬁnd that some consumers who are conﬂicted
between acting prosocially and acting out of self-
interest would prefer to be randomly assigned an
outcome in order to rid themselves of the responsi-
bility of making a choice. In leaving the outcome up
to chance, consumers reduce the moral self-reproach
that would come with choosing a self-interested out-
come. Importantly, this moral self-reproach is so
aversive that people prefer to risk being assigned a
prosocial outcome in order to have the chance of
getting to engage in self-interested behavior with-
out self-reproach. These ﬁndings suggest that for
some consumers, prosocial requests in themselves
pose a threat to their self-view and that choosing a
random option can mitigate this threat. Thus, our
ﬁndings provide insight into consumers’ psychologi-
cal experience of prosocial requests, and a
promising and implementable intervention to both
improve consumer welfare and increase prosocial
behavior.
Endnotes
1Because participants could not choose the
random option in the control condition, the inter-
action only included participants in either condi-
tion who chose either the humorous or prosocial
task. However, simple effects of self-reproach for
those who chose the random option vs. other
options in the random option condition were still
observable in this analysis, which are reported
here.
2We did not record which study participants
took before this study, and thus analyses cannot be
conducted on whether payment amounts may have
affected outcomes. Importantly, random assignment
should have ensured that average amounts of pay
did not differ between conditions.
3In this study, the range of possible outcomes
did not include 0, whereas the range in Study 4
technically did. We decided not to include 0 in the
range of possible outcomes in Study 5 to better
match Study 4 in that participants who donated
would have a certain chance of donating some
amount of money. In Study 4, the chance of
donating was almost certain, with only a 1/200
chance of not donating anything, and thus we
argue that the chance of donating 0 was not
highly salient for participants. However, it is pos-
sible that the inclusion of 0 in the possible out-
comes changes the psychological appeal of the
random option; if 0 is very salient, for instance,
consumers might react negatively, as choosing the
random option might be viewed as more self-inter-
ested. On the other hand, it might be more
appealing, as it gives a chance for participants not
to have to donate at all without self-reproach.
Whether either or both of these effects exist should
be tested in future research.
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Appendix
Study 1 Additional Results and Discussion
Prosocial Behavior Based on Actual Random
Assignment
Random assignment led to the exact same rate
as the expected rate of prosocial behavior
(24.00%).
Choice Depending on Original Preference
Of the ﬁve participants who equally preferred
both options, all 5 (100%) chose to be randomly
assigned. Of the 55 who preferred the prosocial
option, 16 (29.09%) chose to be randomly assigned;
ﬁnally, of the 240 who were leaning toward the
humorous task, 41 (17.03%) chose to be randomly
assigned (see Table A1).
Table A1
Final Choice by Original Preference in Study 1
Final choice
Prosocial Random Humorous Total
Original preference
Prosocial
(preference < 50)
37 16 2 55
Equally prefer
(preference = 50)
0 5 0 5
Humorous
(preference > 50)
4 41 195 240
Total 41 62 197 300
To further illustrate the trends in the data, the
reader can view Figure A1. It is clear that partici-
pants’ preferences for the humorous task grew as
the prosocial task grew longer. Furthermore, partic-
ipants were most likely to choose the random
option when their preference hovered around the
middle (between 25 and 75). However, more of
those choosing the random task came from above
the midpoint, leaning toward the humorous option,
which explains why the random option led to par-
ticipants engaging in the prosocial task slightly
more often than anticipated.
Study 2 Additional Results and Discussion
Prosocial Behavior Based on Actual Random
Assignment
Actual rate of prosocial behavior based on ran-
dom assignment was 24.22% in the random option
condition. This did not differ signiﬁcantly from the
control condition, z = 0.46, p = .65.
Pride
We did not ﬁnd a main effect of condition on
pride, t(427) = 0.19, p = .85, or an interaction of con-
dition and choice (including prosocial and humorous
task only), t(426) = 1.35, p = .18. However, we did
ﬁnd an effect of choice on pride, F(2, 426) = 7.10,
p < .001. Participants who engaged in the prosocial
task felt prouder (M = 3.00, SD = 1.33) than those
who engaged in the humorous task (M = 2.37,
SD = 1.31), t(426) = 3.67, p < .001. Those who chose
the random option fell somewhere in between
(M = 2.37, SD = 1.33); they did not differ from those
who engaged in the prosocial task, t(426) = 1.35,
p = .17, or from those who engaged in the humorous
task, t(426) = 1.46, p = .15.
Figure A1. Each participant’s preference of task as a function of
length of prosocial task, with ﬁnal choice indicated by shape in
Study 1.
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Unsurprisingly, people felt prouder when they
engaged in the prosocial task than the humorous
task. Those who chose the random option seemed
to fall somewhere in between, suggesting that
choosing a random option could actually send a rel-
atively positive self-signal relative to choosing a
self-interested option (i.e., the humorous task). We
further explore this in Study 4.
Other Post-Choice Variables by Condition
We did not ﬁnd any other main effects on the
post-choice dependent variables by condition (see
Table A2).
Table A2
Means and Standard Deviations of the Post-choice Variables by
Condition in Study 2
Random option
condition
Control
condition
Satisﬁed 3.69 (1.04) 3.63 (1.01)
Happy 3.44 (1.10) 3.40 (1.16)
Certain 4.00 (0.87) 3.98 (0.99)
Conﬁdent 3.98 (0.88) 3.95 (1.04)
Other Post-Choice Variables by Choice
For the other post-choice variables, there was a
general pattern such that those who chose the
humorous and prosocial options did not differ
from each other, but those who chose the random
option were generally less positive than those
who chose the humorous option (see Table A3).
This is likely because this measure was taken
before participants were given their outcome, and
thus were not sure how they would feel with
their outcome.
Table A3
Means and Standard Ddeviations of the Undiscussed Post-Choice
Variables by Choice in Study 2
Humorous Random Prosocial
Satisﬁed 3.69a (1.04) 3.42b (1.03) 3.70ab (0.92)
Dissatisﬁed 1.19 (0.57) 1.33 (0.75) 1.25 (0.70)
Happy 3.49a (1.14) 3.04b (1.05) 3.38ab (1.09)
Certain 4.07a (0.92) 3.58b (0.96) 3.91ab (0.89)
Conﬁdent 4.05a (0.97) 3.65b (0.96) 3.85ab (0.91)
Note. Choices that do not share a subscript differ in their means
at p < .09.
Study 3 Additional Results
Part 1 Prosocial Behavior Based on Actual Random
Assignment
Actual rate of prosocial behavior based on ran-
dom assignment was 27.15% in the random option
condition. This did not differ from the control con-
dition, z = 0.76, p = .45.
Part 2 Prosocial Behavior Based on Actual Random
Assignment
Random assignment led to the exact same rate as
the expected rate of prosocial behavior (24.43%).
Additional Descriptive Statistics
Participants' choices in Part 2 of the study as pre-
dicted by their choices in Part 1 of the study can be
viewed in Table A4.
Table A4
Part 2 Choice Predicted by Part 1 Choice in Each Choice Set Condition in Study 3
Part 2 choice
Part 1 total
choice
Prosocial task Humorous task Random
Random option
condition Control
Random option
condition Control
Random option
condition Control
Part 1 choice
Prosocial 4 7 3 19 5 NA 38
Humorous 1 7 51 72 10 NA 141
Random 3 NA 11 NA 23 NA 37
Part 2 total choice 8 14 65 91 38 NA 216
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Study 4 Additional Results and Discussion
Prosocial Behavior Based on Actual Random
Assignment
Actual donation based on random assignment
was marginally higher in the random option condi-
tion (M = $0.59, SD = 0.68) than control, t(319) =
1.87, p = .063.
Pride
Echoing Study 2, we also found a main effect of
choice on pride, F(2, 318) = 30.88, p < .001. Those
who did not donate felt less proud (M = 1.80,
SD = 1.20) than those who donated (M = 2.96,
SD = 1.32), p < .001. This time, participants who
did not donate also felt less proud than those who
chose the random option (M = 2.40, SD = 1.29),
t(318) = 2.2, p = .029. Those who donated also felt
more proud than those who chose the random
option, t(318) = 2.04, p = .042.
Other Variables by Choice
Participants were happiest and most satisﬁed
when they donated a ﬁxed amount, whereas
those who chose a random option or who did
not donate felt signiﬁcantly less satisﬁed and
happy (see Table A5). Participants felt more dis-
satisﬁed when they donated a ﬁxed amount than
when they did not donate at all, whereas those
who chose a random amount seemed in between
the two. These variables are difﬁcult to interpret
because, as in Study 2, participants were asked
how they felt before being assigned a random
outcome. Thus, those who chose the random
option may have felt more negative due to uncer-
tainty of what their outcome would be.
Table A5
Means and Standard Deviations of the Undiscussed Variables by
Choice in Study 4
No donation Random Donate ﬁxed
Satisﬁed 2.97a (1.21) 2.96a (1.10) 3.78b (1.03)
Dissatisﬁed 1.53a (0.88) 1.44ab (0.82) 1.29b (0.64)
Happy 2.72a (1.30) 2.64a (1.22) 3.49b (1.19)
Note. Choices that do not share a subscript differ in their means
at p < .05.
Other Variables by Condition
We found no main effects by condition on the
remaining variables (see Table A6).
Table A6
Means and Standard Deviations of the Undiscussed Variables by
Condition in Study 4
Random option condition Control condition
Dissatisﬁed 1.41 (0.78) 1.43 (0.79)
Satisﬁed 3.35 (1.16) 3.31 (1.23)
Happy 3.10 (1.25) 3.01 (1.36)
Study 5 Additional Results
Prosocial Behavior Based on Actual Random
Assignment
Actual donation based on random assignment
was signiﬁcantly higher in the random option con-
dition (M = $0.68, SD = 1.09) than control, t(298) =
2.26, p = .024.
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